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                                                        NOT PRECEDENTIAL   
     
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______ 
 
Nos. 09-3078 and 09-4599 
______ 
 
MIAN ZEESHAN ASLAM  
a/k/a Zeehan Aslam 
aka Shawn 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
Respondent 
______ 
         
On Petition for Review of a Final Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew R. Arthur 
(No. A073-609-939) 
______ 
        
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 17, 2010 
 
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed : December 17, 2010) 
______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this consolidated petition for review, Petitioner Mian Zeeshan Aslam (“Aslam”) 




2009, the Board dismissed Aslam‟s appeal from the decision of an Immigration Judge 
finding Aslam removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  On November 20, 2009, the Board denied Aslam‟s motion to reopen 
proceedings to apply for withholding of removal.  We will deny the petition for review. 
I. 
 Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly 
summarize the essential facts.   
 Aslam is a native and citizen of Pakistan who was admitted to the United States on 
March 27, 1996, as a lawful permanent resident.  On April 10, 2006, Aslam pleaded 
guilty and was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland 
on one count of smuggling goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 and sentenced to forty 
months imprisonment.  Aslam pleaded guilty to Count Three of the Superseding 
Indictment, which provided, in relevant part:  
On or about May 26, 2004 . . . the defendant . . . fraudulently and 
knowingly concealed and facilitated the concealment of switchblade knives, 
more than 600 counterfeit NASCAR related knives and knife sets, and 
more than 10 counterfeit Lord of the Rings swords and United Cutlery 
daggers and knives, imported contrary to law, that is, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2319 and 2320 . . . then knowing that said merchandise had been 
imported and brought into the United States contrary to law. 
 
Pursuant to this conviction, on November 21, 2008, the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) charged Aslam with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R), for 
commission of an offense relating to counterfeiting for which the term of imprisonment 




    On March 9, 2009, an Immigration Judge found Aslam removable as charged.  
Aslam appealed to the Board.  On June 19, 2009, the Board affirmed the Immigration 
Judge‟s order of removal because it determined that Aslam‟s smuggling conviction was 
predicated on counterfeiting offenses in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319 and 2320.  On July 17, 2009, 
Aslam filed a timely petition for review of the Board‟s June 19, 2009 decision with this 
Court, Docket No. 09-3078.   
 On July 1, 2009, Aslam filed a motion to reopen the Board‟s June 19, 2009 
decision.  Aslam sought to present claims for withholding of removal and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  On August 28, 2009, the Board denied 
Aslam‟s motion to reopen because Aslam had not submitted an asylum application with 
his motion. 
 Aslam then filed what the Board treated as a second motion to reopen the Board‟s 
June 19, 2009 decision.  Although Aslam presented new evidence and a completed 
asylum application, the Board denied this motion on November 20, 2009, because it 
found that Aslam failed to establish prima facie eligibility for withholding of removal or 
protection under CAT.  On December 11, 2009, Aslam filed a timely petition for review 
of the Board‟s November 20, 2009 decision, Docket No. 09-4509.  These petitions for 
review have been consolidated. 
II.  
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, which provides for judicial review of 




offense is an aggravated felony within the meaning of the INA.
1
  Evanson v. Att’y Gen., 
550 F.3d 284, 288 (3d Cir. 2008).  We review the Board‟s denial of Aslam‟s motion to 
reopen.  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007).   
III.  
Aslam‟s petition for review raises two issues.  First, he contends that his 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545 does not “relate to counterfeiting” under 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(R) and therefore cannot render him removable as an alien convicted of 
committing an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Second, Aslam 
argues that the Board abused its discretion in denying his motion to reopen.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will deny the petition. 
A. 
We first consider whether Aslam‟s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545
2
 constitutes 
an “aggravated felony” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).
3
  We have jurisdiction to 
                                              
1
 We do not defer to the Board‟s (or Immigration Judge‟s) interpretation of whether a 
particular crime constitutes an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).  Singh 
v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
2
 18 U.S.C. § 545 provides, in relevant part:  
 
§ 545. Smuggling goods into the United States 
. . . 
Whoever fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings into the United States, 
any merchandise contrary to law, or receives, conceals, buys, sells, or in any 
manner facilitates the transportation, concealment, or sale of such merchandise 
after importation, knowing the same to have been imported or brought into the 
United States contrary to law-- 
  





review this question of law under 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(D).  Because the Board issued a 
final order of removal against Aslam, this petition for review potentially implicates the 
jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), which provides that “no 
court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order of removal against an alien who is 
removable by reasons of having committed a criminal offense covered in section . . . 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) [an aggravated felony].”  However, this Court retains jurisdiction “to 
determine whether these jurisdictional facts are present.”  Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 
203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002).  In this case, Aslam admits that he is an alien but argues that his 
conviction for smuggling under 18 U.S.C. § 545 is not an aggravated felony as defined in 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).  Whether Aslam‟s conviction qualifies as an aggravated 
felony is a question of law falling within the exception to the jurisdictional bar in 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
4
  We exercise plenary review.  See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 288.  
 We turn to the merits of Aslam‟s petition.  An aggravated felony includes “an 
offense relating to . . . counterfeiting.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).  Although Aslam 
pleaded guilty to smuggling goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545, the indictment 
                                                                                                                                                  
3
 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) provides, in relevant part: 
 
§ 1101. Definitions 
(a) As used in this Act-- 
(43) The term “aggravated felony” means-- 
(R) an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or 
trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered 
for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year; 
 
4
 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that nothing in the INA which “eliminates 
judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or 









  The question is whether 
Aslam‟s conviction for smuggling under 18 U.S.C. § 545, predicated on violations of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2319 and 2320, relates to counterfeiting and hence is an aggravated felony 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).   
We presumptively apply the formal categorical approach articulated in Taylor v. 
United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 
2004).  However, if the formal categorical approach fails to resolve this issue, we will 
resort to application of the modified categorical approach.  Id.  Under the formal 
categorical approach, a court “„must look only to the statutory definitions of the prior 
offenses,‟ and may not „consider other evidence concerning the defendant‟s prior crimes,‟ 
including, „the particular facts underlying [a] conviction[].‟”  Singh, 383 F.3d at 147-48 
(quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599-600).   
Here, application of the formal categorical approach requires that we examine the 
statutory elements of 18 U.S.C. § 545 to determine whether it is an offense relating to 
counterfeiting and hence an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).  See 
Garcia v. Ashcroft, 462 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2006) (the formal categorical approach 
requires courts to look only to the statutory definition of the prior offense).  This Court 
listed the elements of 18 U.S.C. § 545 in United States v. Molt, 615 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 
1980).  In Molt, the defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 545 for knowingly 
importing Fiji Island reptiles.  Id. at 144.  This Court stated that “[t]o prove a section 545 
                                              
5
 18 U.S.C. § 2319 criminalizes “Criminal infringement of a copyright.” 
 
6




offense, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: 1) 
received, concealed, bought, sold, or facilitated the transportation, concealment, or sale; 
2) of merchandise after importation; 3) knowing the same to have been imported contrary 
to law.”  Id.  Moreover, to prove the “contrary to law” element, the government must 
specify the statute violated or facts sufficient to prove violation of a particular statute.  
United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550, 558 (3d Cir. 1994).  This venerable requirement 
was first articulated in United States v. Keck, 172 U.S. 434 (1899), in which the Supreme 
Court found “clearly insufficient” the language of an indictment under the precursor 
statute to 18 U.S.C. § 545, which merely alleged that the importation of diamonds was 
“contrary to law.”  Id. at 437.   
The elements of 18 U.S.C. § 545 give rise to myriad grounds for establishing 
violation of the statute.  A defendant may “receive,” “conceal,” “buy,” “sell,” or 
“facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale” of “merchandise after importation.”  
See 18 U.S.C. § 545.  But these actions merely scratch the surface.  Because the 
government must allege and prove the “contrary to law” element by identifying a specific 
statute (or conduct that would violate a statute), many variations of conduct may support 
a charge under 18 U.S.C. § 545.  Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 545‟s exceptional variability 
resists application of the formal categorical approach.     
The “contrary to law” element in particular frustrates the formal categorical 
approach.  A bare examination of the statutory elements of 18 U.S.C. § 545 does not 
resolve the question whether a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545 “relates to 




which is “contrary to law” may relate to counterfeiting.  But in other situations the 
conduct will not.  See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 545 where defendant imported animal horns and 
hides in violation of administrative regulations); United States v. Meyer, 802 F.2d 348 
(9th Cir. 1986) (affirming conviction under 8 U.S.C. § 545 where defendant imported 
obscene photographs in violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1305).  Therefore, we must depart from 
the formal categorical approach and resort to the modified categorical approach.  See 
Garcia, 462 F.3d at 292 (“Statutes phrased in the disjunctive may invite inquiry into the 
record of conviction if it is unclear from the face of the statute whether the conviction 
qualifies as an aggravated felony.”); Singh, 383 F.3d at 162 (“Where some variations 
meet the aggravated-felony requisites and other do not, we have . . . allowed further 
inquiry to see which variation was actually committed.”). 
Aslam protests that the modified categorical approach should not apply.  We 
disagree for several reasons.  First, in Singh, this Court adopted the “modified categorical 
approach” where the statute of conviction was phrased in the disjunctive, meaning that 
“some variations of the crime of conviction meet the aggravated-felony requirements and 
others do not . . . .”  Id. at 162.  Therefore, further investigation was required to determine 
under which provision the defendant had been convicted.  Similarly, in Valansi v. 
Ashcroft, the Court determined that the statute of conviction was phrased in the 
disjunctive because “a mens rea of either intent to defraud or intent to injure would 
suffice for conviction.”  278 F.3d at 214.  Therefore, the Court “took the additional step 




involving fraud or deceit.”  Id.  Here, 18 U.S.C. § 545 is disjunctive because, as 
explained above, some crimes under this statute may relate to counterfeiting and 
constitute an aggravated felony, but others will not.   
Second, in Garcia, this Court noted that for the modified categorical approach to 
apply, the statute must be disjunctive in a “relevant sense.”  462 F.3d at 293 n.9.  To be 
disjunctive in a “relevant sense,” some portions of the statute must qualify as an 
aggravated felony, but other sections must not.  Id.  Here, 18 U.S.C. § 545 is disjunctive 
in a “relevant sense” because, like the statute in Garcia, only some convictions under 18 
U.S.C. § 545 will relate to counterfeiting and constitute an aggravated felony. 
Finally, in Evanson, this Court stated that the rationale for using the modified 
categorical approach is “for the purpose of determining the elements . . . admitted by a 
defendant in pleading guilty.”  550 F.3d at 290 n.4 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).  The 
Court looked beyond the statutory elements to determine whether “the petitioner was 
actually convicted of the charges.”  Evanson, 550 F.3d at 290 n.4; Steele v. Blackman, 
236 F.3d 130, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2001) (to find that alien was convicted of an aggravated 
felony, there must be judicial determination beyond a reasonable doubt of every element 
of a felony or a constitutionally valid plea that encompasses each of those elements).  
Here, the Court must look beyond the bare statutory elements to determine whether 
Aslam pleaded guilty to every element of an “aggravated felony” statute.      
We apply the modified categorical approach.  Under this approach, the Court may 
look beyond the mere fact of conviction, Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, to examine “the terms 




between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the 
defendant . . . .”  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005); see Jean-Louis v. 
Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 466 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying “modified categorical approach” 
by “conduct[ing] a limited factual inquiry, examining the record of conviction for the 
narrow purpose of determining the specific subpart under which the defendant was 
convicted”).  The purpose of our examination of these materials is “to determine what 
elements formed the basis for a defendant‟s underlying conviction.”  Evanson, 550 F.3d 
at 291; Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. 
An examination of the charging document sheds light on the elements underlying 
Aslam‟s conviction.  The Superseding Indictment charged Aslam with violations of 18 
U.S.C. § 545 in Counts Three, Four, and Five.  Appx. at A86-A88.  Count Three charged 
that Aslam “fraudulently and knowingly concealed and facilitated the concealment of 
switchblade knives, counterfeit NASCAR related knives and knife sets, and counterfeit 
Lord of the Rings swords and United Cutlery daggers and knives, imported contrary to 
law, that is, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319 and 2320 . . . .”
7
  Appx. at A86.  Count 
Four charged that Aslam “fraudulently and knowingly concealed and sold, and facilitated 
the concealment and sale of 10,050 NASCAR-related counterfeit knives and knife sets . . 
. then knowing that said merchandise had been imported and brought into the United 
States contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.”  Appx. at A87.  Count Five 
charged that Aslam “fraudulently and knowingly concealed and sold, and facilitated the 
concealment and sale of 5,250 counterfeit NASCAR related knives and knife sets . . . 
                                              
7




then knowing that said merchandise had been imported and brought into the United 
States contrary to law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.”  Appx. at A88.  Notably, Counts 
Three, Four, and Five all reference counterfeit items sufficient to trigger a violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2320. 
Moreover, the judgment of conviction recites that Aslam pleaded guilty to a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 as charged in Count Three of the Superseding Indictment.  
Appx. at A58.  As mentioned, Count Three charged that Aslam “fraudulently and 
knowingly concealed and facilitated the concealment of switchblade knives, counterfeit 
NASCAR related knives and knife sets, and counterfeit Lord of the Rings swords and 
United Cutlery daggers and knives, imported contrary to law, that is, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2319 and 2320 . . . .”  Appx. at A86.  Count Three charged Aslam with 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 545 because Aslam acted “contrary to law” in violation of 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2319 and 2320, which criminalize counterfeiting and trafficking in 
counterfeiting goods.   
Having examined the charging document and judgment of conviction under the 
“modified categorical approach,” we now turn to the ultimate issue: whether Aslam‟s 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545 for smuggling merchandise imported “contrary to law” 
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319 and 2320, relates to counterfeiting and is thus an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).  We believe Aslam‟s conviction 
relates to counterfeiting. 
In conducting this analysis, we first note that the phrase “relating to” must be 




Similarly, the Court in Park v. Att’y Gen. held that the term “counterfeiting” as used in 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) has a “broad reach.”  472 F.3d 66, 72 (3d Cir. 2006); see Drakes 
v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2001) (“forgery” as used in § 1101(a)(43)(R) “must 
not be strictly confined to its narrowest meaning”); Albillo-Figueroa v. INS, 221 F.3d 
1070, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting narrow reading of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) 
because the statute covers a range of activities beyond counterfeiting).   
Second, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320 has been held to relate to counterfeiting.  
In Park v. Att’y Gen., Park pleaded guilty to selling clothing which bore the counterfeit 
trademarks of Nike and Tommy Hilfiger in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.  472 F.3d at 
68.  Based on this conviction, DHS charged Park with removability as an alien who had 
committed an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(a)(iii) as defined in 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).  Park, 472 F.3d at 69.  The Immigration Judge found Park 
removable, and the Board affirmed.  Id. at 70.  On review in this Court, Park argued that 
a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2320 was not “an offense . . . relating to counterfeiting” 
and could not be an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).  Park, 472 
F.3d at 71.  The Court rejected Park‟s argument after canvassing Chapter 25 of Title 18 
of the United States Code; this search revealed an array of federal statutes criminalizing 
both the “act of counterfeiting” and “the knowing use of the end product of an act of 
counterfeiting.”  Id. at 71-72.  The Court noted that 18 U.S.C. § 2320, which criminalizes 
trafficking in counterfeit goods, squarely fell within the spectrum of federal statutes 
prohibiting counterfeiting.  Id. at 72.  Finally, the Court noted the broad reading of the 




conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2320 related to counterfeiting and qualified as an 
aggravated felony, resulting in dismissal of Park‟s petition.  Id. at 72-73.   
Here, Aslam pleaded guilty to smuggling under 18 U.S.C. § 545 based on conduct 
which violated 18 U.S.C. § 2320.  Appx. at 58, 86.  For the reasons discussed in Park – 
the wide spectrum of “counterfeiting” offenses under federal law and the broad reading 
of “relating” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) – we agree with Park‟s determination that 18 
U.S.C. § 2320 “relates to counterfeiting.”  While we note that this case is not exactly like 
Park because Aslam pleaded guilty to smuggling under 18 U.S.C. § 545, not to 
trafficking in counterfeit goods under 18 U.S.C. § 2320, the principle remains that the 
conviction “relates to counterfeiting” and hence qualifies as an aggravated felony.
8
     
In sum, we believe that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 545, where the 
merchandise smuggled was imported “contrary to law” based on a violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2320, “relates to counterfeiting” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R).  Therefore, Aslam is 
removable as an alien who has committed an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).   
B. 
                                              
8
 Citing cases that indicate, for example, that a misprision of felony conviction does 
not “relate to” an underlying narcotics felony, see, e.g., Castenada de Esper v. INS, 
557 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1977), Aslam argues that his conviction under § 545 cannot 
“relate to” counterfeiting.  Whatever merit those cases may have – and we do not 
speak to that here – we are not persuaded that they are controlling in these 
circumstances, which involve, as we have already noted, a direct relationship between 
Aslam‟s smuggling count of conviction and the counterfeiting crimes on which that 
conviction was based.  Given the broad reading we are required to give to the phrase 
“relating to counterfeiting,” see Park, 472 F.3d at 72, we are satisfied that Aslam‟s § 




Aslam also challenges the Board‟s denial of his motion to reopen to apply for 
withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  The Board denied Aslam‟s motion 
because it determined that Aslam failed to make a prima facie case for withholding from 
removal.  For the reasons discussed below, we will deny Aslam‟s petition.   
We have jurisdiction to review Aslam‟s legal question regarding the application of 
the prima facie standard.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002); 
Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1281 (9th Cir. 2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  In 
Toussaint v. Att’y Gen., we recognized that our jurisdiction “„includes review of the 
BIA‟s application of law to undisputed fact.‟”  455 F.3d 409, 412 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541 (3d Cir. 2006)).  Here, the Board denied 
Aslam‟s motion to reopen because it determined that the evidence Aslam produced did 
not establish a prima facie case for eligibility for withholding of removal.  Just like 
Toussaint, Aslam‟s petition “involves not disputed facts but whether the facts, even when 
accepted as true, sufficiently demonstrate that it is more likely than not” that Aslam 
would be persecuted under one of the protected grounds.  455 F.3d at 412 n.3; see Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004) (granting petition for review of Board‟s denial of 
motion to reconsider for failure to satisfy prima facie case where Board applied incorrect 
legal standard).  Therefore, we have jurisdiction to review Aslam‟s petition based on a 
question of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
When the Board “denies a motion to reopen on the ground that the applicant has 
failed to make a prima facie showing,” this Court will “review that determination to 




Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007); Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174.  This 
standard of review is “highly deferential,” Guo, 386 F.3d at 562, and the Board‟s decision 
“will not be disturbed unless [] found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Tipu 
v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994).  Finally, the Board‟s factual determinations will 
be upheld if they are “„supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on 
the record considered as a whole.‟”  Liu v. Att’y Gen., 555 F.3d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)). 
To satisfy the prima facie case for withholding of removal on a motion to reopen, 
the applicant “must produce objective evidence showing a „reasonable likelihood‟ that he 
can establish [that he is entitled to relief].”  Shardar, 503 F.3d at 313 (alteration in 
original, citations omitted); Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174.  “A „reasonable likelihood‟ means 
merely showing a realistic chance that the petitioner can at a later time establish that 
asylum should be granted.”  Guo, 386 F.3d at 564.  In Guo, the Court considered a 
motion to reopen to apply for asylum and determined that the “reasonable likelihood” 
standard meant merely showing a “realistic chance.”  Id. at 560, 564.  Here, Aslam has 
moved to reopen to consider his claim for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(A)
9
 rather than asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).  Although the 
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 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) provides:  
 
§ 1231.  Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed 
. . . 
(b) Countries to which aliens may be removed. 
. . . 





withholding and asylum provisions are similar,
10
 we note some differences between these 
two grounds for relief.  Whereas asylum is a discretionary decision, withholding from 
removal, if established, is mandatory.  Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 182 (3d Cir. 
2003).  Consequently, the burden for establishing a prima facie case for asylum (“a 
“realistic chance” that the petitioner can at a later time establish that asylum should be 
granted,” see Guo, 386 F.3d at 564) is lower than the burden for withholding of removal 
(“more likely than not”).  See Lukwago, 329 F.3d at 182; INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 
(1984).  The exact contours of what a petitioner must show to make a prima facie case on 
a motion to reopen for withholding of removal are somewhat unclear.  However, because 
Aslam cannot satisfy even the lower burden of showing a prima facie case for asylum, we 
necessarily reject his motion to reopen for withholding from removal.     
We apply Guo‟s “reasonable likelihood” test to the Board‟s November 30, 2009, 
denial of Aslam‟s motion to reopen, and because Aslam failed to show a “realistic 
chance” of establishing a basis for relief, Guo, 386 F.3d at 564, we conclude that Aslam 
failed to make a prima facie case.  Aslam‟s motion to reopen contained a police report 
submitted by his uncle alleging that Talibani extremists entered the uncle‟s home, 
demanded money, and demanded information about relatives in the United States.  The 
                                                                                                                                                  
(A) In general. Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may 
not remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien's 
life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien's race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
 
10
 The withholding from removal provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), and the asylum 
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), have the same “protected grounds” of “race, 





Talibani extremists then kidnapped Aslam‟s grandfather, and Aslam submitted an 
autopsy report showing that his grandfather had been murdered.  The Board‟s review of 
Aslam‟s newly presented documents determined that none of the harms that befell 
Aslam‟s family “related to a protected ground” for withholding of removal.  Aslam 
argues that the Board abused its discretion by not considering whether Aslam‟s 
membership in a particular social group – his grandfather‟s family – entitled him to relief.  
“Kinship ties” may create a “particular social group” which is one of the protected 
grounds for asylum and withholding claims.  See Singh, 406 F.3d at 196 n.5.  However, 
the Board determined from Aslam‟s evidence that the Talibani Mujahidins were targeting 
people “to generate money to fight back the Pak Army offensive against them,” not 
because of their membership in a particular social group.  We will uphold the Board‟s 
factual determination regarding the motives of the Talibani Mujahidins because it is 
supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence in the record.  See Liu, 555 
F.3d at 148.  Moreover, insofar as Aslam‟s “kinship ties” to his grandfather‟s family 
create a “particular social group,” Aslam‟s evidence as interpreted by the Board shows 
that this protected ground is only an “incidental, tangential, or superficial” basis for the 
persecution, subordinate to the motive of generating money.  See Ndayshimiye v. Att’y 
Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[A]sylum may not be granted if a protected 
ground is only an „incidental, tangential, or superficial‟ reason for persecution of an 
asylum applicant.”).   
Because the Board found that Aslam‟s evidence does not reference a protected 




granted.  Guo, 386 F.3d at 564.  Aslam thus failed to establish a prima facie case for 
withholding.  Therefore, the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Aslam‟s 
motion to reopen. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied as to each matter under 
appeal. 
 
